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our trade with China, if it were enlarged to include
Hong Kong and secondly how far policy decisions arising
from the loss of Hong Kong (and whether by U.K. or China)
might tend to invalidate the assumptions in paragraph 5
above or otherwise to have effects on the U.X. economy.
(a) Natural consequences" for Anglo-Chinese trade
13.
Assuming that the present U.K. import regime for goods
of Chinese origin (cuch imports totalled £34 million in
1966) applies unchanged to the enlarged China, there is no
reason to expect any significant change in the level of
U.K, imports, for imports from China of the manufactured
goods of types which comprise most of Hong Kong's output,
are subject to quota limits. The essential question under
this head therefore is whether and how far incorporation
of Hong Kong would affect China's capacity to import and
in particular to import from the U.K. (U.K. exports to
China are on a steeply rising trend and totalled nearly
632 million in 1966).
her
China's own figures indicate 44./1t her been estimated that in 1966 Chimakx/net foreign
exchange earnings and receipta from Hong Kong totalled some- what less than £240 m or
2000x22Ûxnataixx over a third of her total earnings
of foreign exchange). This includes about 1930 million
of remittances from overseas Chinese to China via
Forge Lon
As these last would not necessarily cease
with the incorporation of Hong Kong into China, the total
somewhat
loss of earnings might be XXXZHOXANNYXORSAY / XXXX XXXX something over
**X*£200 million. Against this has to be set such of
Hong Kong's earnings and receipts from overseas as might
continue after she had been incorporated into China. 15. In 1966 the main items in Hong Kong's external
re-exports to China and the
receipts (dicregarding/invisible transactions with the
U.K. referred to in paragraph 6 above) were; approximately:-
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