TNAG-0042-FCO40-78-Future-Sovereignty-of-Hong-Kong-Defence-Review-Working-Party-1967 — Page 48

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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There are no reliable figures for long-term capital

movements, but such indications as there are puggest that

they are small and can safely be ignored for present

purposes.

6. On invisible account (items (b), (c), (e) and (2))

the U.K. showed a net deficit in 1966 of $10 million.

After the loss of Hong Kong and on the assumptions in

paragraph 3 items (b) and (e) would simply cease.

We

It is

do not know the composition of (c), but the figure is

small and some part of it may well represent transfer

payments (rather than payments for serviços).

therefore assumed as a matter of convenience that these

U.K. earnings would cease and their cessation would

release no resources. While the balances are assumed

to be blocked, carninge on them would continue to accrue

((2)). Although these would not be transferred they

*

would be recorded as an invisible debit in the basic

balance of payments ("financed" by a corresponding monetary

inflow). While this debit would be reduced in so far as

releases from the balances were made to U.X, residents,

for present purposes we assume that a debit of £15 million

would continue, The overall result on invisibles

therefore would be that we would show a total not deficit

of £15 million, as oppoced to £10 million in 1966 1.e. a

net loss to the balance of payments of £5 million,

7. The effects of the loss of Hong Kong on the visible

account would depend to a major extent on the use (if any)

to which the resources currently used for exports for

Hong Kong wero put (and at what speed) and how far U.K.

resources were fully employed at the time, The extreme

worst assumptions might be:

3

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