21.
10
Overt Americen involvesant in negotiations for
handing-over Hong Kong scene out of the question
ven
present U.3. policies. In this situation the best ve
could expect would be that fear of American remotion
to a forcible take-over might be a factor inclining
China to seek a megotiated solution end, in doing so,
not to press us too hard. On the other hand, if
irorionn attitudoa more to chonzo to the extent of
lending their weight to a negotiated transfer, it
seems likely that there might be a climate in U.S./
Chinese relɛtions in which the Chiness might well
judge that they had no reason to foar strong American
action or pressure on our behalf,
22. It is unlikely that we could make any piny vith
tho faot that in international 1ax Hong Kong Island
and the tip of Kowloon peninsula vors oaded to us în
perpetuity (soo faragraph | of Section A), in the
face of Chinn's attitude that these were "unsqual
treaties" - an attitude for which there could be
considerable support from other ocuntries (although
Rusela would no doubt be reluctant to recapt the
proposition that treaties with China involving the
transfer of territory are all "unoquei"). These
areas could not be viable separated from the main
industrial areas in the New Territories; the frontier
in Kowloon would be impossible to contral ;
the sen
and går approaches could be claimed as under de
Chinese control as well na being under their de fnote
control. Continued retention of these areas would make
no sense, sither economically or politically.
23. Timing of a negotiated withdrawal. A number of
relevent factors have been noted in this repart,
argued in Section D, true negotiations could not be
mounted in present conditione xkik in China and we
cannot foresse then these may be more favourable.
TO: SECRET
Nor
/could
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