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Emergency Evacuation
17.
If we lose control of the situation, and, assuming an orderly with- drawal is impossible and a Macao-type situation unacceptable, we shall be forced to embark on an emergency withdrawal. This would confront us with
sone formidable problems. The numbers of people for whom we are respons- ible and should evacuate are very large. Our military assessment is that we could hold on for no more than 48 hours against strong Chinese military pressure, although a longer period is conceivable if the only threat posed is of internal disorder. Internal disorder on a scale substantial enough to lead to our starting to evacuate the Colony would undoubtedly encourage
Chinese "volunteers" to cross the border in large numbers; in such circum-
stances it would be extremely unlikely that we could hold out for long. In the circumstances in which withdrawal was necessary, airlines would probably not be operating through Hong Kong and few ships would be calling. Arrangements would have to be nade for requisitioning ships and aircraft. The Americans, whose warships frequently visit Hong Kong, could be of great assistance, but we feel that because of the risk of a leak we should not now seck to plan jointly with then. In the face of a sharp deterioration in the situation it would, however, be necessary to do so.
18. There would be great difficulties in placing any significant number
of Chinese whom we were able to evacuate. We could not take many into
this country; America and Canada night take significant numbers and some South American countries might offer special facilities. Taiwan would no doubt take quite a large number. We cannot, however, talk to any of
these countries in advance. There are also a number of difficult economic
and financial questions to consider in the event of an emergency
evacuation.
Planning
19. Despite all those difficulties, we feel that it is essential that contingency plans for evacuation should be drawn up in advance as soon as possible. This, however, poses a major difficulty. It is vital that there should be no leak about the preparation of contingency plans for
withdrawal. The whole situation in Hong Kong turns on the morale and confidence of the local population, and in particular of the Chinese police. Once local support and confidence is lost, the situation could deteriorate overnight. Once we are seen to be making any move which could be interpreted as preparatory towards withdrawal, our control would offect- ively be lost. This means that, in our opinion, the existence of any contingency plan for evacuation must not become known to anyone in Hong Kong, save the acting Governor and the Commander, British Forces, and we are advised that it should not become known also to Far East Headquarters in
Singapore, save only for the Corriander-in-Chief.
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