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3.
Hong Kong.
(d) The situation described in (a) above could be
followed by a Chinese decision to create border
troubles to assist the Hong Kong communists, with consequences as in (b).
It should, of course, also be recognised that there is
an optimistic assumption, namely that the authorities in
Hong Kong will successfully restore order, the local communists
will accept defeat for the time being, and there will be a
respite before trouble on a similar scale occurs again. By
then, mainland China may again be stable, and the status quo
relationship with Hong Kong will be reaffirmed. In this case,
If this
no critical decision will be required of HMG.
assumption should prove correct we should (a) seek the
earliest moment whenever China becomes more stable to
negotiate an organised withdrawal at an agreed date; (b) in
the meantime we should work as speedily as possible to create
a better world image in Hong Kong. We have made a start in
the field of labour reforms and local democracy is now
on its
way but this, of course, is not relevant to the present official
paper which is to consider the prospects for withdrawal.
4. Much of this ground will be covered in greater detail
by a later official report. But it will be helpful in
considering the details of Hong Kong policy during the
summer recess to know that the Committee has been made aware
of my own views at this stage.
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