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B.
1.
THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF OUR POSITION IN HONG KONG
Military. To assist the Hong Kong Government in maintaining internal security and control of the frontier and to identify aggression in the event of an armed Chineso attack, we are obliged to maintain in Hong Kong a garrison
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of the order of six to seven major units. [ Take wiely Agha Air Force
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aircraft stationed in the Colony. Naval forces consist of the coastal mino- sweepers and a frigate. The direct annual cost of maintaining these forces in Hong Kong is about £16 million to which Hong Kong contributos £5 million. We have in addition to maintain a reinforcement capability.
2. The offective reinforcement of the garrison might not be possible if the internal security situation got out of control as a result of pressure from China, including possibly a mass influx from China into the Colony; nor could dre reinforce it effectively in face of an outright Chinese invasion. As indicated in our Interim Report, evacuation from the Colony is likely to be a very difficult, if not impracticable, operation. Our forces in the Colony aro thereafter at serious risk if tho Chinoso decide to tako ovor.
3. At a time when wo are reducing our other commitments and forces east of Suoz, we are precluded from making any major roduction in our forces in Hong Kong. Any significant decroase there would seriously affect confidence in the Colony by casting doubt upon our intention to maintain our position there and might also be interpreted by China as an indication that wo were preparing to leave, With the planned withdrawal of our forces from Singaporo/Malaysia.in tho 1970s, our garrison will be left at the ond of a
[Take in slapp B] very long line of communications and its mora difficult,
and rainforcement will become
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THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
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