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of military invasion) by which the Chinese might make our position in Hong Kong untenable: industrial action, the cutting off of food, water and other essential supplies, and an embargo on trade. The report might recall that Hong Kong had lived for a considerable period under the shadow of threats of this kind; supplies had been cut off at times in the past but life had not been rendered impossible, although strict rationing had been necessary. The report should indicate what means were open to us to resist measures which the Chinese might take, and for how long resistance would be possible. It should point out that while in other circumstances shortages and essential supplies might be self-regulating in that they would induce many people to leave Hong Kong for China, in present circumstances it seemed unlikely that the Chinese would permit an exodus. Finally, the report should consider the steps open to us if a withdrawal were forced on us; what proportion of the population we might hope to evacuate, what were the priority categories and the numbers involved, the machinery for evacuation and the military implications, and whether there were any special assets or installations which we should try to remove. Recommendations for immediate
action could best be considered when the other sections of the report had
been drafted.
The Working Party
(1)
Long-term Study
Invited the Commonwealth Office, in consultation with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, to prepare a first draft of an interim report on possible withdrawal from Hong Kong on the lines indicated in discussion.
The Working Party then turned to consider the preparation of a wider-ranging study of the position and long-term prospects of Hɔng Kong.
The draft outline for a report which the Commonwealth Office had prepared
was considered, and a number of modifications were suggested.
Additionally,
the following main points were made
(a) The report should consider in what circumstances a voluntary negotiated
withdrawal from Hong Kong might be possible and advantageous to us.
If we
accepted that sooner or later we should have to withdraw, there could be advantage in our choosing our time and taking the initiative in seeking a
negotiated settlement. Such a move would be in line with our general policy
of reducing our commitments and military involvement in the Far East, and could be a way towards a modus vivendi with China. It seemed unlikely that an opportunity for such an approach would be presented before the
disappearance, by death or other cause, of the present Chinese leader,
Mao Tse Tung. As long as he remained in power we must expect a
continuation and perhaps an accentuation of the present Chinese pressures.
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