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of the Plan, Its success would have dopendodon tho ability of
government officers to interpret correctly and quickly to give offcct
to acts of detailed instructions that would have boon issued to dosignatod
officers only when tho Governor had givon the order for the Plan to bo
put into oporation.
35. So far as tho proparation of a plan is concerned, there is perhaps
ways of surmounting tho dilonna posod by the nood to plan away from Hong
Kong and Singapore. If Hong Kong's Dofonco Socrotary could produce the
skoleton of a plan, wo night horo be able to put flesh on it by calling
on the servicos of military and civil personnel in the United Kingdon who
have knowledge and oxporionco of Hong Kong. The resultant plans could be
votted by a very tight group of senior officers in Hong Kong under arrange-
monts for which the Defence Socrotary would be responsible. But tho
inherent weakness would romain of a plan for which no advance preparations
had boon mado on the ground. This deficiency night not be corious if the
cvacuation of only two or three thousand was tho aing but it might woll
provo fatal to getting away a numbor of the order of 150,000. An
alternative might be to sond out a toan of Service officers under a suitablo
clock to propare the plan and to romain in tho Colony with rosponsibility
for carrying out the actual oporation if ordered. This would in part romovo
the weakness of the other plan.
13th July, 1967.
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