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Courses of Action
14. Recently it has become necessary, because of the increased violence being used by the local communists, to take very firm steps to disrupt
the communist leadership in Hong Kong.
turn to take stronger counter-measures.
Such action may cause Peking in
We have less to fear from this
Nevertheless with all
than allowing the situation to get out of control. the uncertainties in China and Hong Kong we must consider what we could do if the situation suddenly deteriorated or Poking decided to intervene and push us out. This would present us with three possible courses
of action:
Seek he
(a)
to organise an orderly withdrawal
(b)
to be prepared to accept a Incao-type situation
(c)
to carry out an emergency evacuation
a substantial number of
Orderly Withdrawal
15. we could not possibly evacuate the numbers of people involved (see
01.12 time
paragraph 13) nor safeguard our material, interests without China's co- operation or, at least, acquiescence. As we believe that it is China's present intention to humiliate us and force an abject surrender on us, clearly
at this stopp negotiations to obtain co-operation or acquiescence would be fruitless.
Macao-type situation
16. We have therefore considered the alternative of a Macao-type
situation the essence of which is that effective control would be given up
to the Chinese communists. What this would mean in practice is outlined
in the Annex. Such a situation would have the advantage of limiting immediate bloodshed and might perhaps make it easier eventually to surrender the Colony in an orderly fashion. In practice, however, it would provide
no guarantee against future bloodshed, and would place us in a weaker position when it came to negotiating any eventual settlement. We should suffer humiliation as great as that involved in withdrawal, and we should
continue to suffer it without any prospect of termination. Our people in Hong Kong would be the hostages of the Chinese communists and this position could be used to extract concessions from us. This situation would be of considerable advantage to Poking, since it would enable her to control Hong Kong both politically and economically, while not sacrificing the benefits obtained from the Colony. We have also considered whether concessions to Peking or the local communists short of
a Macao-type surrender would be a reasonable alternative to withdrawal; but it must be recognised that once we began to make substantial concessions, we should be inexorably on the road towards complete surrender to Chinese control, since the Chinese would recognise our weakness and
exploit if fully as they did in Macao.
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