Ꭲ .
SOCKET
needed might be creating a lacao-type situation in for Konie
6. rs art said th t two points should be borne in mind. First, it would be foolish for us to bare our plans for Hong Kong on optimistic assumptions. Secondly, we s..ould recognise that as a result of disturb nces over the ust few months confidence in Hong Kong's economy was already declining. Unless the growth rate was maintained at about 8 per cent per annum the economy would decline and we should be faced with unemployment. Once this began the situation
woul deteriorate.
7. The Forein fecret ♫• said it seemed likely th Oct ber woul be the danger point this year.
8. Er. Folland said that the Hong Kong working Part, had reached the provisional conclusion tnt if we had to decide between accepting a Macao-type ritu.tion an. withdrawal we should choose the letter. Sir Arthur Calsworthy suid that if it buc me knoɑn tut we inte ded to withdraw the morale of the police would colla se. This ruled out withdrawal from ong Kong over a long period. Tong Fang's rel. tions wit Feking had been at their best Men there had been a strong Cinese Government. The time to start to extricate ourselves would b. when our relations with Peking improved.
J. The Foreign Secretary summed up by saying that it should be our aim to look for developments in China which would rovide a convenient moment to with raw from long, onɛ in good order. In present circumst cer, ho ver, we could not plan Actively to do anything except to hng on.
lc. .S. to Com onwelth Secretary
14
rs. art
I. Routers P.U.S. (F.0.)
Sir A. Gals.ort y
Sir Greenhill (1)
•
r. de la Mare J. Carter (C.0.) Planning Staff
SECRET
(D. J. D. Maitland) Private Secretary
KHMER 1967
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