TNAG-0041-FCO40-77-Future-Sovereignty-of-Hong-Kong-Defence-Review-Working-Party-1967 — Page 152

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Sir Saville Garner

The possibility of a British withdrawal from

Hong Kong

The

and

We discussed this problem with Sir David Trench and General Worsley, the Commander of the British Forces in Hong Kong.

2. The last occasion on which a thoroughgoing interdepartmental examination was made of our position in Hong Kong was in 1959. object of the study then was to consider what risks we incurred, what advantages we gained or disadvantages we suffered by retaining Hong Kong; and, if the risks and disadvantages outweighed the advantages, what steps (if any) we should take, and when, to prepare for withdrawal from Hong Kong. The study considered the possibility of negotiating a transfer of sovereignty before local conditions made this impossible, securing some protection for British subjects and our friends in Hong Kong and compensation for ourselves. But several objections were seen to this course:-

(a) we could not make or even prepare for any move which might

destroy the confidence on which our position or our bargaining power was based;

(b) Hong Kong could not be considered in isolation from the West's

general containment policy in the Far East (as it was then conceived);

(c) under a negotiated transfer Her Majesty's Government would be

handing over British subjects, and a million refugees, to a Communist State, without any likelihood of obtaining adequate guarantees of protection.

So the conclusion was reached that we must retain sovereignty for the time being, even if this made it more difficult, and even impossible, to save something through negotiations. But it was suggested that whenever it began to look as if the Chinese might consider serious

pressure on Hong Kong we should have to weigh carefully the pros and

cons of attempting negotiations or allowing ourselves to be expelled.

3. From the time when this paper was produced in 1959 until the

development of the Cultural Revolution last year relations between Hong Kong and Communist China were reasonably satisfactory. They were based on Peking's acceptance of the status quo, announced in March 1963 (when Peking said that the "unequal Treaties" would be re-

negotiated when the time was ripe, but that meanwhile they were

content with a continuation of the status quo in Hong Kong).

number of occasions the Communist authorities showed a helpful attitude to Hong Kong, e.g. during the severe drought of 1963-64,

On a

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and