in the light of
Indeed, agamit
decision to withdraw
entirely from the
Far East,
Вим
we could not expect an increased defence contribution from Hong Kong during The period of the four year agreement", expering in 1971.
of our intention to maintain our position in Hong Kong it would increase
the risk of a move by China; that risk woula be greatly increased if
our withdrawal was interpreted as an intention to abandon our interests
and commitments throughout the Far Eastand was accompanied by stable situation in Hong Kong.
a len
19. It is therefore important that withdrawal from the Yer Rast
should not be seen by the Chinese es a prelude to the abdication of our
position in Hong Kong. Nor must it be seen in this light in Hong Kong
where the resultant loss of confidence could be quite disastrous for
the economy and for internal security, quickly changing a viable and
stable territory into an unviable and unstable one; this in turn would
impair the Colony's present value to China and could change a valuable
market for British #xports into an expensive liability for the British
exchequer.
20.
This points to the desirability of strengthening the Hong Kong
garrison at the time of withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore (if only
as
Wzonume
to
on a temporary basis) to demonstrate/our allios, to China and to public
opinion in Hong Kong and elsewhere that we intend to maintain our
position there,
world be
more
21. there are arguments for strengthening the garrison on e permanent
basis. While by 1970 it will be possible to reinforce Hong Kong from the
U.K. clmost as quickly as it can be reinforced from Singapore today, i.e.
in 48 hours, the need for prompt reinforcement would be the greater in
the more nervous state of public opinion in Hong kong and since
temptation for the Chinese to exert pressure on and within Hong Kong
would be increased. ↑
22. For these reasons it might be prudent to station in the territory th
two units by which it would otherwise here to be reinforced in a serious
In the absence of fories in Singapore there would also be a internal security situation, and to retain some-cover by fighter aireraft need to provide for occasional vints by nowal venel, 6 fighter awwaft tô
la te, assert sovereignty over the Colony's airspace and
waters. Subject to the availability of transport, these additional
forces would be available for the reinforcement of our other dependent
territories in the Pacific.
/Retention of a British Military Presence in
Australia,
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