TNAG-0041-FCO40-77-Future-Sovereignty-of-Hong-Kong-Defence-Review-Working-Party-1967 — Page 116

1:

1

Indeed, agaust a decision to withdrawd entirely from the Four East,

But we could not expect defence contribution.

an mostanrad

of our intention to maintain our position in Hong Kong it would increase

the risk of a move by China; that risk woul. be greatly increased if

our withdrawal was interpreted as an intention to abandon our interests

and commitments throughout the Far East and was accompanied less stable situation in Hong Kiing.

19.

a

It is therefore important that withdrawal from the Per Best

should not be seen by the Chinese ea a prelude to the abdication of our

position in Hong Kong. Nor must it be seen in this light in Hong Kong

where the resultant loss of confidence ocul4 be quite disestrous for

the economy and for internal security, quickly changing e viable and

stablo territory into an unviable and unstable one; this in turn vou là

impair the elony's present value to China and could change a valuable

market for Dritial: Axports into an expensive liability for the British

@xchequer.

20 This points to the desirability of strengthening the Hong Kong gerrison et the time of withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore (if only

meas

or a temporary busis) to demonstrate our allies, to China and to public

opinion in Bong Kong und elsewbore that we intend to maintain our

pozition there.

would be

in ore

21.7 there arguments for strengthening the garrison on a persianent

basis. While by 1970 it will be possible to reinforce Hong Kong from the

U.K. almost as quickly as it oun be reinforced from Singapore today, 1.8.

in 48 hours, tha usod for prompt reinforcement would be the greater in

the sore nervous state of public opinion in Hong Kong and since

tuaptation for the Chinese to exert pressure on and within Hong Kong

would be increased.^

from Hong Kong during 22. The fened of the

For these reasons it might be prudent to station in the territory the

Your year agreement to units by which it would otherwise here to be reinforced in a serious

exporng

In 1971,

û need

In the absence of forces in Singapore there would aby be internal security situation, and to retain some cover by fighter aireraft

to

provide for occasional visit ́s by haral vessels and fighter aircraft- and naval vessels to nasert sovereignty over the Colony's airspace and

waters. Subject to the availability of transport, these additional

forces would be availɛble for the reinforcement of our other dependent

territories in the Facific.

/Retention of a British Military Presence in

ustralia.