clashes, culminating on the 10th August, in an attack on the Man Kam To Police Post, caused British Security
Forces to close the Man Kam To Bridge on the following
day.
This, of course, prevented importation of livestock and produce at this point. However, these were diverted by the Chinese authorities to Lo Wu and imported by rail. Normal traffic at Man Kam To resumed on the 25th August,
1967, and continued until the 14th October, 1967, when
another incident resulted in the abduction of Senior
Police Inspector F.G. Knight, and the closure of the bridge, which had a similar effect cn imports. bridge remained closed until the conclusion of talks
Since (see paragraph 14), on the 26th November, 1967. that date trade across the bridge has gradually returned
to pre-confrontation levels.
12.
The
It is pertinent to note that, at this time,
the C.C.A. considered themselves to be part of the "masses" in line with a general policy directive by the Peking Government. Consequently the Border Defence Regiment
personnel felt bound to acquiesce in, if not to support, the "revolutionary" actions of the villagers. During the period between the end of June and the beginning of September, 1967, when tension was at its peak, there is no evidence that the C.C.A. made any sustained attempt to restrain these provocative acts. In fact, in several instances C.C.A. personnel themselves took a threatening
stance.
13.
From a tactical point of view the C.C.A.
reacted to all British military moves, reinforcing when we brought up additional units and withdrawing when we
did so.
Even so there was never any indication that the
C.C.A. were prepared to launch an attack on British
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