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(E) by the risks that even the use of tear gas against demonstrators will invoke retaliation by small arms fire which even if only intended as token retaliation could easily escalate;
(F) by the encouragement given to demonstrators by their own cultural revolution hysteria; by our restraint; and probably now also by urban Communist leaders who see this as a way to restore some of their lost morale; and
(G) by the desirability of keeping open the rail access at Lo Wu and the road access at Man Kam To for the movement of essential foodstuffs (although this has to some extent lessened since rail dislocation led to a significant switch to river transport).
4.
It has to be accepted that in these circumstances we have had to give up some measure of the border controls, particularly at Lo Wu, which we maintained in normal times with Chinese co- operation. None so far is vital and there is little doubt in my view that public opinion generally is behind us in our policy of restraint. Although some may call for a tougher line, the great majority seems to believe that the risks of major Chinese intervention are greater from a tough, provocative policy than from a restrained, if apparently weak one.
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5.
As a result of the Man Kam To incidents we have closed the border at Man Kam To itself and are planning a tighter control between Lo Wu (which it is important to keep open) and Sha Tau Kok (which it is topographically almost impossible to close).
This, as well as some revision of our troop dispositions at the border posts, will make it easier to identify and tackle incursions.
6.
Our assessment remains that the C.P.G. does not want trouble on the border and that the P.L.A. is trying, if not altogether effectively, to prevent excesses and also illegal immigration. It may take some time to see reactions to, and the effectiveness of, our closure of the border at Man Kam To and other measures to tighten border security. Meanwhile the internal situation within Kwangtung Province is obviously very disturbed and a potential threat.
7。
Fundamentally, therefore, I regard the situation on the border as unchanged. The Man Kam To incidents were setbacks and the Communists have been able to make propaganda capital out of the signed documents and press photographs but in general local opinion is that they were pyrrhic victories and is relieved that no blood was shed and no arms lost. In some ways these events should have enabled us to strengthen our military position on the border but the situation is inevitably going to remain tense and very delicate for some time.
(Passed as requested and advance copy to Resident Clerk Foreign Office F.E. Department, Mr. Glover (News Department) Commonwealth Office and Private Office for Commonwealth Secretary).
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