TNAG-0035-FCO40-71-Relations-with-Macao-1968 — Page 193

ox

should only provide craft with the

knowledge and agreement of the Chinese

authorities.

with

These points have been agreed wild, the Governor of Hong Kong.

(1) Hong Kong can only participate in an

•

organised evacuation of civilians taken as

a precautionary measure before any forcible

Chinese action is begun. Once the Chinese

have embarked on a take-over by force, and the Portuguese are directly engaged in resisting- it HongKong's role must be confined to

offering temporary shelter to any Portuguese

nationals who make their own way to Hong

Kong territory.

The Governor of Hong Kong has suggested that

we might impress on the Portuguese Government the

need for very careful thought before embarking

on any course that ✰✰ would lead to all-out

confrontation with Peking.

Presumably the

Governor has in mind that a Chinese take-over

in Macao would increase tension in the area and

might result in increased Chinese pressures

against Hong Kong. We do not, however, consider

that Peking is likely to change its basic

policy towards Hong Kong as a result of

developments in Macao, if only because of Hong

Kong's high economic value to China.

It seems

clear that the Chinese are anxious to settle

the Macao dispute, naturally on their own terms.

The only remaining obstacle, so far as we know,

is the Chinese insistence on the Portuguese

admitting that they have committed a 'crime'

against the Chinese

The Portuguese, not

endind

surprisingly, are not prepared to do this.

The allinde of the From the reactions of their Ambassador here

bear out- here it

is clear that they would strongly object to any

pressure by us on them to accept the Chinese

demands on this point. In the circumstances,

see paragraph 12 below)