K13/136/1
SECRET
Copy on
HWB 10
10/19 (75)
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
16 February, 1967.
5/51
Reply at (52)
lopy sent to
Hunter.
On T.S.
AMEX.
Recent events in Macao have raised the consideration whether British forces might be used to assist in the evacuation of our community in the event of a complete breakdown of law and order.
Such a plan has not been made before, for various reasons. The physical difficulty of landing forces in Macao is considerable, as only very shallow-draught vessels can approach the peninsula. The Chinese lay claim to the territorial waters around Macao, and while we have not recognised their claim we should be reluctant to dispute it openly. It would clearly be impossible to land forces there without the knowledge of the Chinese, or against organised resistance by them. The possibility of retaliatory action by the Chinese against Hong Kong was, and still must be, borne in mind. And finally, it seemed likely that a Chinese take-over of Macao would be relatively orderly, and that British lives would not be endangered.
These reasons are still overriding but the cultural revolution in China introduces a new factor. A civil war, or at least a locul conflict between pro- and anti-ao elements does not seem impossible. The Red Guards are by
no means well-disciplined and the Chinese authorities might well be unable to keep order.
This, then, is the dilemma with which we are faced. I do not think we should ask for a Service assisted plan to be drawn up at the moment but perhaps it might be as well that those who would be concerned should be informed of the nature of our problem.
C.A. Henn, Esq.
D.5. 11,
Linistry of Defence.
SECRET
(J.M. HUNTER)
CONSULAR DEPARTMENT
SPECIAL CARE 23 MAR 067
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