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SECRET
M
Copy No.
Cypher/Cat A
PRIORITY PEKING
ΤΟ
FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 906
30 September 1968
851
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 906 of
30 September, Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
(844) 01(845)
Hong Kong telegrams Nos. 2030 and 2031: Grey.
It now seems clear that there is no prospect of progress through negotiation. As predicted, the attempt at negotiation has failed to provide a clear answer and has raised danger of Chinese setting a high price. We seem to be back in situation we were in when we first debated this matter some weeks ago. What do we do now? The Governor's advice is that we should now do nothing, but wait for Chinese to release Grey in their own good time. I disagree, for following reasons:
2.
Firstly, such a course is difficult to justify on humanitarian grounds, and presumably will be difficult to defend to public and Parliamentary opinion in United Kingdom. We have in fact been waiting for Chinese to release Grey in their own good time for 15 months already. Chinese have been making reassuring noises
But through Li and contact about release in "fairly near future" is this not exactly the kind of thing they would say, if their aim was to dissuade us from action or publicity and thus save them- selves embarrassment?
3.
•
Secondly, the argument against unilateral release of Hsueh ((E) of Hong Kong telegram No. 2031) does not follow from evidence we have. Chinese have said they do not want negotiation. They
If Chinese have not said they do not want release of Hsueh or Lo. are prepared to release Grey eventually if we do nothing, surely it will only accelerate the process if we release the relevant NCNA prisoners. Would not their release provide Chinese with
It "opportunity" for which Chou En lai is said to be waiting? may be argued that this might lead to price raising and would be an act of faith. But views of contact seem to be that danger of price raising arises from offering to negotiate rather than from actual release. We should distinguish between situation where Chinese are obliged to stave prices [sic] "negotiation" and situation where they are not obliged to say anything but are nonė- theless under pressure to respond (i.e. if confronted with actual release of prisoner). In any case, I do not see how unilateral release of Hseul or Lo is a greater act of faith than that performed by waiting indefinitely for Chinese to act in their own good time, without offering any concession.
4.
Chinese
We must, however, acknowledge that, with passage of time, Hsueh is now rapidly losing his value as a potential concession. I recommend therefore we give renewed consideration to release of Lo for this purpose, as originally envisaged in your telegram
If, in addition to Hsueh, we also release Lo, 797 No. 1414.
would simultaneously be confronted with a real concession from us and with greatly increased embarrassment and pressure to reciprocate.
In my view 3 things are necessary to secure Grey's early
5.
release:
(a) A concession
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