TNAG-0033-FCO40-69-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 189

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risks that are unacceptable.

In addition to th

points made in paragraph 12 of your telegram

under reference we would almost certainly be

under severe, if unjustified, criticism here

for having given up our bargaining counters

without making an effort to satisfy ourselves

that this would secure Grey's release. And, as

you say, we would have greatly limited our

possibilities of being able to do anything for

Grey.

more

3. In these circumstances Kinisters consider

that we should seek to initiate secret discussio

with the Chinese. So as to make the maximum us

of Hsueh (while we still hold him and can thus

represent his premature release as a gesture of

goodwill on our part), and for humanitarian

reasons, they further consider that the

approach should be made quickly; and that we

should from the outset be ready to offer to

include Lo in the exchange (for reasons advanced

in paragraph 6 of Peking telegram No. 765).

We therefore hope that you would see no

objection to putting forward as soon as possible

through the Cater channel a proposition on the

following lines:-

(1) Cater would say that in the improved

atmosphere that has followed the resumption

of the grant of some exit visas to our

Kission it ought to be possible to settle

the question of Grey which remains an

irritant in our relations.

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/(11) A