TNAG-0032-FCO40-68-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 88

releases of detainees against the release of

British subjects in detention in China. However,

the significance of Hong Kong is now so clear

that there seems little advantage in trying to

play it down. Moreover, we are sure that the

Chinese would not consider the release of detai❤

nees as an appropriate quid pro quo for the

release of Mr. Grey, and we doubt very much

whether it would directly influence their atti-

tude towards other British subjects either.

3. We recognise that there is ho moment which

from the Hong Kong point of view could be regar-

ded as ideal for making Concessions, but since

neither we nor you would judge releases of this

sort to be a mador concession, we would hope

that they could be made at a time when the situ-

etion vis-à-vis the local Communists is "not

PLACE unfavourable* (your telegram 928). If you were

(711)

to see strong objection to the simultaneous

release of the number of detainees Hopson pro-

poses, we think that the release of several

small groups over a period of weeks would also

be beneficial. But in the light of the fore-

going considerations, as seen here we believe

there could be substantial advantage in a larger

gesture involving a minimum of ten persons.

4. We should be most grateful if you would

consider these suggestions and let us have

your views.

5. If the Chinese honour their undertaking on

visas and we match it by a gesture on release

of detainees, this might create the sort of

atmosphere in which we could work towards a