TNAG-0032-FCO40-68-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 49

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T

in particular Anthony Grey, as well as more reasonable

treatment for the staff of this Mission and our Shanghai

bankers. We should at least improve the prospects of

carly release or deportation of other British subjects

imprisoned or under arrest in China. The Chinese verbal

response would probably remain grudging or offensive;

nevertheless there is a good chance that their acts as opposed

to their words would be helpful and that we should have laid

the foundations of a now and more relaxed phase in our

relations.

17. This course, like any other, would be subject to

disadvantages and risks which I do not wish to discount.

A

It

can be argued that any such act as an amnesty would be widely

regarded by public opinion as an abject surrender to the

communists and would thus encourage further Chinese pressure

against Hong Kong. However, for the reasons already set out in

this paper I am not impressed by this argument, nor do I think

that predictions of an automatically unfavourable public response

should be allowed to assume a decisive part in arguments over

policy in Hong Kong. I am sure that the Hong Kong

Government Information Services are capable of presenting, and tho

Hong Kong public of understanding, an annesty as a responsible

act of good government: the fact that it also coincides withi

communist interests is not sufficient reason, particularly

in the special circumstances of Hong Kong, for it to be

automatically condemned. For the reasons given carlier,

it scons to me highly improbable that these releases would be

/followed

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