TNAG-0032-FCO40-68-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 47

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reasons given in paragraph 9 above, it would be unrealistic

to expect that external pressures c.g. by diplomacy, publicity

or economic measures (if we can find any) will of themselves

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restore Sino/British relations to a normal level.

The Argument for Earlier Release of Some Prisoners.

This

15. The alternative course is that, while we should of course,

keep up external pressure on the Chinese authorities to behave

better, we should accept the need for moves on our part in

Hong Kong that might lead to an end to confrontation.

will always be a delicate matter and the likely cost in Hong

Kong terms would have to be carefully weighed; but we should be

actively exploring the possibilitics. The release of the

fifty detainees now hold under emergency legislation scons

the obvious first step and in view of the encouraging

reaction (or lack of it) from the communist press in Hong Kong

to the releases already effected, I hope it may be possible to

push ahead with that as fast as possible. I think, however,

that careful consideration should also be given to the

possibility of arranging carlier release of prisoners convicted

in the courts; for example those not convicted of serious

violence and those in sectors of particular interest to the

Chinese, such as newspaper workers. I am aware that this

idea of an amnesty was considered premature when it was

nooted some months ago. Nevertheless, more than a year

has elapsed now since the confrontation campaign began

and more than six months since violence ended. Has not the

time come to take another careful look at the cmnesty idea,

and make sure that we are not, in rojecting this out of hand,

denying

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