TNAG-0032-FCO40-68-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 46

CONFIDENTIAL

!

produced four exit visas for this Mission). The release

of prisoners, more than a year after the crisis and seven

months after violence ended, at a time when the Hong Kong

Government is under no great pressure, might be seen by the

people of Hong Kong and by British opinion as an act of

statesmanship coming from strength. Communist propaganda

would, no doubt, claim a victory (this would be an essential

part of the exercise) but it would be wrong to conclude that

we would thereby have suffered a real defeat. If tension were

reduced in Hong Kong and there were consequential improvements

in Sino-British relations wo should in fact have made

important gains.

14. The policy implied in the argument in paragraph 12

seems to me to be one of great pessimism, for which a heavy

price, human, political and perhaps economic, would have

to be paid probably over several years. It rejects at

the outset the possibility for flexibility and initiative on

our side. It accepts the possibility of continued detention

for British subjects in China and abandons hope of restoring

Sino-British relations even to anything like their old level.

Nor, I believe would such a policy necessarily protect Hong

Kong against further communist disturbances. The failure

to make the gestures needed to end confrontation might sooner

or later provoke further unrest, which as the Governor has

recently stated is ever a latent threat.

Further unrest could

mean further arrests. It would not then be just a question of

sitting tight until 1970, or 1971 or 1974.

the makings of a self-perpetuating crisis.

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We would have

Meanwhile, for the

/reasons