TNAG-0032-FCO40-68-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 44

CONFIDENTIAL

too much face but without compromising our essential interests?

At this point it may scen reasonable to object that any worthwhile

concession to the Chinese would be dangerous, in that it would

cncourage extremists to ask for more and undermine our

position in Hong Kong. The argument might run that, the

release of confrontation prisoners (which would probably have to

be the nub of any settlement) would be a fatal blow to public

confidence and the prestige of the Hong Kong Government and

would encourage the communists to make new and more outrageous

demands leading eventually to humiliation on the Macao pattern.

The communists, it might be argued, have shown no real roadiness

to reach a settlement. Alternatively, if they really do want

one, we have only to sit tight and wait for them to climb down.

Our only course therefore is, while avoiding provocation, to

maintain a firm front to Chinese pressure, to make no

discrimination in favour of communist prisoners and to let them

serve their term. The majority would be released in the

nornal way in 1968 and 1969 (though some 80 to 90 will remain.

in prison after that date, some until 1974). Until then

the corresponding injurios to Sino-British relations in terms of

detention of British subjects and decrease in British exports

to China will have to be reluctantly accepted as a necessary

evil. We should of course bring all possible external

pressure on the Chinese, e.g. by diplomacy, publicity and economic

measures to compel them to conform to more civilised standards.

But there should be no concessions in Hong Kong.

CONFIDENTIAL

/13.