TNAG-0032-FCO40-68-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 43

CONFIDENTIAL

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we will not tolerate violence and disorder in the colony,

is one which I think is understood and broadly accepted in

Peking: If, however, we go on from there to attempt to cut

down on communist positions, giving the impression that, for

example, we are attacking communist cducation as such, then

wo endanger the basis of our co-existence and risk a new and

more violent confrontation. Obviously we have no intention

of assisting the communists in their present state of

convalescence in Hong Kong: but there is a great difference

between that and measures which will be seen in Peking as

signalling an offensive on our side.

11.

This need to co-exist means not only taking account of

Chinese sensitivities but recognising that they have become much

sharper than two or three years ago. Much has happened since

then the Cultural Revolution, communist success in Macao,

confrontation in Hong Kong, setbacks to Chinese policy over

Victnan

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and it is no longer possible to argue, in defence

of a course, that it was followed two or three years ago without

trouble. This attention to Chinese sensitivities is not to

be regarded as a surrender, rather as the adjustment to a

powerful neighbour which ordinary prudence would dictate.

Moves to End Confrontation. The Negative Argument

12. Is it possible to go beyond this negative policy of

avoiding further friction and to take positive steps to end

confrontation? Is there a gesture which we can concede to the

Chinese in order to enable then to climb down without losing

/too

CONFIDENTIAL