CONFIDENTIAL
6.
What can wo do? xternal pressures on the Chinese by
diplomacy, publicity and possibly conomic measures may
help but are unlikely of themselves to ensure a return to
pre-confrontation co-existence. Retaliatory measures on
our part in London would only be counter-productive.
(Paragraph 9)
7. As a first step we must try to avoid further friction
in Hong Kong, taking account of currently heightened Chinese
sensitivities.
(Paragraphs 10 and 11).
8. Are there positive steps we can take?
It can be argued
that the necessary concessions would cost us too much and we
must therefore wait until the confrontation prisoners are
released in the normal way between now and 1974.
12).
(Paragraph
9. Objections to this argument. Its assumptions on public
opinion and Chinese intentions are questionable. Its cost,
human and political, would be high lasting over years. In
Hong Kong it would be more likely to prompt than preclude
further unrest. (Paragraphs 13 and 14).
10. The alternative course calls for positive steps in Hong
Kong to end confrontation both by the release of detainees
and carlier release, say at the end of 1968, of convicted
prisoners not involved in scrious violence. The advantages
and risks of this course. (Paragraphs 15, 16 and 17).
CONFIDENTIAL
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