TNAG-0032-FCO40-68-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 191

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The conclusion is for the Mission (and British subjects detained in China) to soldier on and help us to convince the Chinese that in the long-term it is not in their interest to behave like yahoos. There is some force in these arguments and in the argument that if we show the Chinese that we are prepared to bargain the release of the innocent Mr. Grey against the premature release of convicted news workers in Hong Kong this might encourage them to use other detained British subjects or to seize further British subjects in China in order to secure the release of other Communist prisoners in Hong Kong.

4. The fact remains however that if we do nothing Mr. Grey may remain in solitary confinement in Peking until 1971. I think therefore we are obliged to probe Chinese intentions to try to discover whether there is not some bargain to be struck which would not involve concessions so damaging as to shake confidence in our ability to continue to govern in Hong Kong. As regards tactics, we might:

(a) try to open a dialogue with the Chinese in Peking or through an official or unofficial channel in Hong Kong to discover what the quid pro quo for Mr. Grey's release is.

(b) hold up the release of Hseuh Ping set for 17 November, 1968, on the grounds that for a considerable period after his imprisonment he refused to work and thus forfeited remission. (Hong Kong telegrams No. 802 and 827)

Such

The intention would be to provoke a Chinese protest which might in turn have the effect of opening a dialogue about Mr. Grey. In the present strained state of relations it seems unlikely that any worthwhile dialogue could be opened in Peking. a possibility would depend on an improvement in Sino-British relations which in turn depends on the resolution of difficulties in Hong Kong! As regards a dialogue in Hong Kong the Governor would no doubt be reluctant to use any of the normal channels such asN.C.N.A. He might conceivably consider using a more discreet channel but the process might be long and inconclusive. The delay in the release of Hsueh Ping would almost certainly create an atmosphere in which it might not be ideal to begin negotiations but from the point of view of Reuters and public opinion in this country there would be certain advantages in not releasing Hsueh without some attempt to use him to help Mr. Grey.

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