local
has been
Yapata
( But in all this we must
recognise that, without something
Ihat can
victory
M
be
represented as a
The Chinese are most
unlikely to release Nr. Grey).
and boosting their morale at a time when the
Hong Kong Government were successfully establish-
It would not in any case
ing ascendancy.
necessarily help Mr. Grey and would certainly
damage confidence in the colony. He has pointed
out that although there is sympathy for Mr. Grey
in Hong Kong, many sections of opinion think
that the case fo
is not of direct consern to Hong
Kong and therefore does not justify the taking
of risks in Hong Kong. The Governor's general
attitude (summarised in Hong Kong telegram 884)
that any concessions which are not of a
major character and therefore damaging, would
be unlikely to produce any marked improvement
in Sino-British relations. Some minor
concessions can be made to mute communist
stridency and "cut the ground from under their
feet", but we should not expect real dividends
has been
from them.
policy is to soldier on and convince the
Chinese that in the long term it is not in
their interests to behave like "yahpoos".
His conclusión is that our best
9. There is some force in these arguments.
They wo ld appear to be to some extent justified
by the recent shift in the Chinese position
as regards our Mission in Peking, which has
taken place without any major concession from
Hong Kong. There is the additional argument
that if we show the Chinese that we are
prepared to bargain the release of Mr. Grey
against the p remature release of convicted
newspaper workers in Hong Kong, this might
encourage them to use other detained British
subjects or to seize more British subjects in
China in order to secure the release of other
communist prisoners in Hong Kong. A
/ 10.
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