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PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 699.
SECRET
30 July, 1968
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 699 of 30 July Repeated for information to:- Hong Kong
(739)
My immediately preceding telegram and Hong Kong telegram No. 928. [British policy towards China]
It is suggested in paragraph 8 of Hong Kong telegram under reference that release of detainees and earlier release of prisoners would be a major concession without good grounds for expecting a response and therefore [?grp omitted] "minority concessions made with specific and limited tactical aims." I question the reality of this distinction. The concession would certainly be important, but the Chinese have repeatedly made it clear to us that release of prisoners is the root of the problem. To make concession on this would therefore
not be acting in void. We would be responding on a key issue and could confidently expect a return. As I pointed out in (699) my telegram No. 671, there is little doubt for example that
release of news workers in Hong Kong would ensure the release of Grey.
2.
Paragraph 8 of telegram under reference argues that we must wait until the Chinese come to us and propose whatever it is they want and when we know this we might be able to meet them at least partially, but in fact the Chinese have already made themselves perfectly plain. Of five demands release of prisoners is only one with any real content. In the light of our experience over last year (e.g. over lifting of our movement restrictions) we are most unlikely to get them to give more explicit undertakings of what they will do if we release prisoners.
3. Paragraph 3 of telegram argues that we should not rush things. Release of some prisoners on New Year's day 1969 could hardly be so described.
4. I am puzzled by the arguments in paragraph 4 of Hong Kong's telegram under reference that the public would find it harder to accept the need for major concessions now since the situation in Hong Kong is not unfavourable. Hitherto it has been argued strongly that concessions could not be made because the situation was unfavourable and that any concessions would therefore be interpreted as a sign of weakness, e.g. Hong Kong telegram No. 928 paragraph 3. This amounted to saying (if I understand the argument aright) that when we are under pressure concessions are precluded because they will be seen as a sign of weakness and when we are not under pressure they
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.63
TUTE 1968
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