TNAG-0031-FCO40-67-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 220

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commitments at an early stage in the talks.

8. The Chinese side made relatively limited use' or built-in

advantages such as:

and non-abuse as a

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(1) Willingness to use abuse as a weapon concession. At one point in the talks, after a particularly heated exchange over Chinese use of the word "fascist", the chief Chinese negotiator offered to desist from using the tern if the British side would "change its attitude" (sixth meeting, page 3). (ii) British difficulties in controlling the 'press.

The fact

that the Chinese made less of an issue of leaks in the Hong Kong press about the border talks than might have been expected suggests that they have a somewhat more realistic appreciation of the nature of a free press than might be supposed (tentà meeting, page eleven). (iii) Readiness to use threats of further border incidents to

put pressure on the Hong Kong government.

Only once (third

aceting, page 12) did the Chinese openly resort to a more or less

explicit tireat of this nature.

The

(iv) Kon-recognition of colonial status of liong Kong. argument that the abducted Hong Kong Chinese villager Yiu Kanva held a Hong Kong identity card was ignored by the Chinese side, who merely claimed he was a "reactionary" and would be dealt with in

China.

9. The Chinese were reluctant to admit the principle of reciprocity e.g. in the site for the talks and the exchange of

Koreover, when they finally agreed to the

prisoners.

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