TNAG-0031-FCO40-67-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 218

CONFIDEIFMAL

(second meeting) with the British representatives, but was not

implemented by the Chinese on the pretext of the need for further

discussions and the appearance of British troops at the point on

the border where the projected exchange was to take place. It is

possible that the Chinese side overstepped their brief in conclu ing

agreement so rapidly, or that there were "hard" and "soft" factions

amongst their superiors in Canton, or Peking. But it is sore

likely that the Chinese were surprised at the willingness of the

British side to agree so swiftly in principle to their "denards",

and dccided that further concessions could be wrung out of the

Hong Kong authorities simply by prolonging the talks. Such an

accommodating attitude on the British eide may well bave disconcerti the Chinese, particularly in view of the Hong Kong Government's

fira line in dealing with the Communist disturbance in the colony,

and Her Majesty's Goverment's steady refwal to respond to the

Chinese Government's five demands on Hong Kong of May 14.

4.

Another factor in the Chinese decision to press for further

concessions may also have been the desire of the Chinese military

to gratify peasant opinion, in view of friction between civilians

and the military in Canton province at the time, ard the presumed

desire of the Chinesc border forces to dissuade Chinese farmers fo

instigating further disturbances on the frontier. Thus principal Chinese negotiators reference to the mead of the peasants (third meeting, page one).cannot be dismissed as entirely disingenuous.

These considerations might explain to some extent the Chinese

/anxiety

CONFIDENTIAL

*