TNAG-0031-FCO40-67-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 128

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CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIORITY PEKING TO

FOREIGN OFFICE

13 June 1968

Tio 560

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 560 of 13 June. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.

The arguments [word omitted] publicity are similar to those in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 558. There are however additional disadvantages:

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(a) It would put the Chinese more publicly on the spot so that any concessions on their side might be seen as response to pressure of world opinion. The Chinese might become more intransigent in consequence.

(b)

There is a risk that in order to justify themselves they might engineer some incident or trump up charges against the staff of the Mission. In the present circumstances espionage is an obvious possibility, though we must hope diplomatic status would protect us from the full consequences of this.

(c) Publicity would be more difficult to control than diplomatic pressure. It would be harder to confine it to the question of interference with the movement of diplomats.

It would readily extend to the question of Hong Kong, which in Press of certain countries would get involved with issues of colonialism and so on,

(a) Publicity could also generate pressure in the United Kingdom for undesirable action against the Chinese officials, e.g. renewed restriction on movements. It is fundamental to proposed exercise that we should at all costs avoid any such action against the Chinese at this stage. It would completely stultify diplomatic or publicity campaign, would provoke Chinese retaliation and we should embark again on unhappy cycle of restrictions and counter-restrictions from which we have just escaped. I hope therefore it can be taken as firm ground that we shall not (repeat not) take such action at this stage whatever Press or public in general may suggest.

Despite these considerable risks I think we should arrange for at least one informed Press article to coincide with the diplomatic campaign. I suggest we try for a leader in the Times. It should confine itself to the same points as in the diplomatic campaign though it might add some reflection on the uncivilized nature of Chinese conduct. Such an article would not necessarily spark off a great deal of comment in the United Kingdom or abroad. It would on the other hand serve as warning to the Chinese of possibility of a wider Press campaign and give us an opportunity of judging their reactions.

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I think we must also begin planning now for wider Press campaign which may have to follow later in the game if Chinese remain unresponsive to pressures proposed in these telegrams.

Such a campaign would cover wider issues, e.g. British subjects in China and needs careful planning and control once launched.

4. Above recommendations for diplomatic and some publicity pressure involve distinct risks. However I think that the time has come when these risks have to be accepted if we are not to remain entirely passive in Chinese hands. I should add that chances of success of this exercise will be virtually destroyed if at the same

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