TNAG-0029-FCO40-65-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 35

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inhibits our action in Hong Kong. Apart from domestic political considerations here, it is very doubtful if the Chinese, given the attitude they have adopted, would be prepared to agree that

and we should withdraw our Mission. They would gain nothing; they probably also attach acne importance to maintaining their own activities here. From the point of view of the Government

of Hong Kong there is some advantage in a direct channel of communication with Peking which avoids the necessity of dealing directly with local communist representatives on major matters.

(b) Rupture of Diplomatic Relationa

We could of course try to force the Chinese hand by formally breaking relations. But this might simply deprive our Mission in Peking of such protection as they derive from their diplomatic status, while the Chinese continue to keep them es hostages. Moreover, es a matter of face, the Chinese would be practically bound to try to make serious trouble for us in Hong Kong. A secondary objection to a rupture would be the loss of trade which would almost certainly be involved.

(c) Economic Sanctions

Threats to stop trade from the United Kingdom would not modify the Chinese attitude, and loss of trade would be harmful to us here. Economic measures in Hong Kong directed against

China would hurt the Colony more than the Chinese.

(a) Action arainat the Chinese Mission in London (See also

Annex C)

Our Mission in Peking are strongly opposed to further action against Chinese officials in London, e.g. restrictions

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