TNAG-0029-FCO40-65-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 29

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and

Chinese intentions, were trying to deport or "release to

Chine"; the continued detention of the "Demodocus";

the arrest of Mr. Barrynaine.

10. Against this background of uncertainty, the Governor

of Hong Kong has had an informal approach, through delicate

but normally reliable intermediaries, purporting to have

originated with Chou En-lai. According to this approach,

the Chinese authorities would like to discuss ways and means

of bringing the troubles in Hong Kong to an end; they were,

however, having difficulties with their own activists; the

basic for the discussions would be the previous "demands" of

the Chinese Government but the majority of these would be

insisted on in token fashion only; the most difficult problem

was likely to be the release of the political prisoners in

Hong Kong, but there was nothing that could not be solved by

negotiation. On the recommendation of the Governor of Hong

Kong (Hong Kong telegram No. 330), we have authorised him to 364 follow up this approach with due caution and using a repre-

Flag

sentative who can, if necessary, be disowned.

Hong Kong (See also Annex B)

11. We have so far held that the Governor, while not being

over-rigid, should take only such measures of relaxation as

were desirable in the context of bringing things in Hong Kong

back to normal; and that if we started to make concessions

under Chinese pressure, we should be on a very slippery slope

indeed. Sir D. Hopson has suggested that it may now be in

our interest to explore the possibility of a face-saving

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