CONFIDENTIAL
Peking telegram No. 159 to Foreign Office
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(a) If public opinion considers that denying entry visas to NCNA assists Grey's chances it is mistaken and the mistake could be readily corrected. Public opinion based on a major misunderstanding of case should hardly be allowed to decide our policy.
(b) We are not withdrawing our Mission. We are merely replacing staff. Any idea we would be abandoning Grey is mistaken and again any public misconception can be easily corrected. No one in this Mission is ever going to be inactive over Grey. And for reasons given above, settlement on visas would not impair and should in fact improve his chances.
(c) We have deliberately kept public opinion rather in dark about predicament of staff here (though we cannot expect this state to continue indefinitely). If public were informed that we had taken chance of getting diplomatic machinery back into normal working order, which should help Grey, I do not think they would be unsympathetic. On the other hand if they realised that because we could not make immediate progress over Grey we were keeping whole of Mission bottled up in Peking, without thereby helping Grey, they might well be critical.
May I therefore repeat my recommendation of 25 January having a slightly more precise form? We should inform the Chinese as soon as possible:-
(a) That we have lifted exit visa requirements for all their officials in the United Kingdom.
(b) That entry visas will now be granted freely on a reciprocal basis;
(c) That the Bank of China and NCNA entry visas are granted;
(a) That the above acts have been taken on the understanding of reciprocal treatment by the Chinese.
I should add if we were to go only part of the way, e.g. lift exit visa requirements and grant the Bank of Chine but bot NCNA visas, we give the Chinese the perfect excuse for not reciprocating.
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I realise there may be some temptation to wait for progress on Grey, e.g. access, before accepting these recommendations. If of course we had had earlier information on practical interpretation of the prison rules in Hong Kong we would almost certainly have had access by now. In any event the above argument stands independently. As explained above, I hope we shall now manage access before long, but that is an independent issue and should not be made a pre-condition of settling the visa problem. To defer a settlement until we see Grey is to subordinate the whole of the above argument to public opinion founded on a misconception of the case. I am convinced that to settle on the basis of the 24 January proposals is our only course; that it is inevitable if we are not to be kept here indefinitely; and that there are compelling reasons for taking the necessary action as soon as possible.
/Foreign Office
CONFIDENTI AL
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