326
Cypher/Cat.A
CONFIDENTIAL
328A
MEDIATE
elno. 159
CONFIDENTIAL
PEKING TO
FOREIGN OFFICE
4 March 1968
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 159 of 4 March. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
(323) *(328)
My telegrams Nos. 152, 153 and 158.
The interviews with Hsueh and Kao give us a much clearer picture of the Chinese attitude and our prospects on two questions of Grey and visas, As regards Grey it seems likely that as a result of our offer of 1 March we shall now make progress on the question of access. There may be some trouble with the Chinese over ancillary matters e.g. comforts for prisoners but basically they seem ready to play and may therefore be ready to let us see Grey soon. They are unwilling however to show their hand yet on the question of an exchange and we shall probably have to wait until after prison visits and after we have seen their reaction to the trial deportations before getting some idea of their price. Or they may well be waiting until visa problem is solved before answering on this point.
2. As regards visas, we have made no progress at all towards free movement (Mrs. Holroyd's visa is nothing new since even last October the Chinese gave visas to pregnant wives). It is now nearly four weeks since our offer of 7 February and six since the original Chinese proposals of 24 January. Particularly in view of Kao's latest remarks, I fear we must assume that we shall not get any formal reply and that the Chinese intend sitting tight waiting for us to accept their proposals. They have meanwhile
the
given clearest indications why they object to our offer: fact that although we say we are prepared to lift restrictions we have not done so; and secondly the exclusion of NCNA entry visas. We can be sure even if they were to return a form of answer it would make precisely the same points. They har. also reaffirmed their readiness to make reciprocal gestures if we meet their requests (Kao this time was not (repeat not) speaking on a personal basis). We therefore know where we stand.
30 I consider therefore there are now compelling reasons for going ahead and clinch the deal on the basis of the 24 January proposal as soon as possible:
(a) If we settle (i.e. lift our restrictions and grant entry visas including those for NCNA) we are sure of making progress on movement problem. In fact chances are extremely good that we shall solve it completely. It is equally clear that there is no other way of making progress and that if we refuse to clinch the deal we can resign ourselves to a prolonged detention in China for the staff of this Mission with families, 45 persons in all.
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(b) By refusing
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