:
CONFIDENTIAL
2
given them time to consider their attitude to our offer of the film stars and had given them an opportunity to claim that they had obtained the release of these people. We were prepared quietly to do the same for others of those we held in custody; but it was absurd to suppose we would release anyone in Hong Kong except on expiration of a sentence imposed by the Courts. Our object was to provide them with an earnest of our desire to reduce the area of disagreement between us, as should have been apparent to them. Instead, they had tried to make capital out of the incident, and we would now be justified in having serious doubts about the bona fides of their recent approaches to us. Moreover NCNA were now trying to go outside the understandings come to in Peking on prison visits. However, we were aware of the possibility that there had been bungling on their side and would suspend judgment on their bons fides pending an indication from them on whether they wanted those in custody released early or not, we were well aware of their difficulties over "deportation" and, while not accepting their attitude, we would nevertheless not formally deport provided we had their cooperation in discouraging any attempt to return until the situation was fully normalised. In general, our attitude in such approaches would be one of annoyance but willingness to try again; and we should try to hold the dialectical initiative.
50
Meanwhile the film stars should be placed in formal detention under Colonial Secretary's order (maximum period is one year under this legislation) and those under deportation orders after release from prison should continue to be held pending arrangements for their deportation. This I am arranging to do.
349
бе
I suggest further that we should take the line I am proposing through all the channels available to us more or less simultaneously: in London and Peking, and here through the channel referred to in my Top Secret telegram No. 331, and the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company (with whom we originally dealt). I am very doubtful however of using the Political Adviser's talks with NCNA over the prisoners also. He could mention our feelings to them perhaps, but I am not anxious to inflate their quasi-diplomatic position.
7. We might couple these approaches with a harder publicity line over the position of the Mission in Peking and Grey as suggested in paragraph 8 of Peking telegram No. 179, to emphasise our displeasure.
Finally, the chances of a more favourable Chinese attitude emerging very quickly as a result of this course of action are perhaps not particularly good, but I cannot suggest
8
/anything
CONFIDENTIAL
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.