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22 January 1968
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 65 of 22 January. Repeated for information to Hongg.
Your telegram No. 77.
264
Following for Permanent Under Secretary of State.
I think reading of situation in your paragraph 1 is right and that de-escalation in Hong Kong, waning of cultural revolution and Chinese return to more normal diplomatic practice (now evident in other spheres) should eventually produce desired effect. Main requirements are time and reciprocal concession.
2. We are still uncertain to what degree our detention here is related to situation of Chinese Office in London and to what degree it is related to Hong Kong. As regards concessions, it is, therefore, important to distinguish between those affecting the Chinese Office in London and those in Hong Kong. In the first field our object is to restore freedom of movement for ourselves. It is, therefore, in our interest to be as. forthcoming as possible and we should be prepared to make concessions in expectation of encouraging similar concessions on Chinese side. The model should be lifting of movement restriction in London in November which was followed by Chinese here. I am not (repeat not) suggesting continuation of unilateral concessions on our part but a series of probes as opportunity offers which can be exploited if Chinese respond or stopped if they fail to do so. We are hoping that grant of an entry visa to Hsu Tan Shu will provide opening for similar Chinese move. Mr. Ma's recent references to entry visas for Bank of China etc. were encouraging as indicating that Chinese have some interest themselves in restoring movement. Exit visas may be more tricky if Chinese refuse to apply but we may see situation more clearly after interview on 24 January.
3. Concessions in Hong Kong are in a different category and we must of course be guided by Governor's judgment of situation there. there is also a danger that early concessions would be seen as a sign
I agree that of weakness and that pressure on this Mission and British subjects might be maintained in consequerce with the object of extracting further concessions, leading to a Macao like situation. In the light of Governor's comments in Hong Kong telegram No. 92 T think there may be a case for sitting tight for a while in Hong Kong and waiting to see what other side have to say.
I agree they may be ready at some point to indicate their price not (repeat not) for (discuting) of non-violent campaign in Hong Kong which seems likely to go on but for return to better treatment of British subjects in Chine and this Mission. They may at present be waiting to see first how much they can get without asking.
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