TNAG-0028-FCO40-64-Relations-with-China-1968 — Page 108

2.

CONFIDENTIAL

HONG KONG Telno 150 to COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

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(e) We would not propose to initiate any publicity for the operation if it went smoothly, but we should of course work out a propaganda contingency plan against the event of a breakdown or leak, and in order to ensure that the incident did not do too much damage to the credibility of the deportation weapon.

There is a problem about timing. The prisoners receive regular fortnightly visits of which the next is due on 8 February. Since these visits provide an obvious opportunity for their political friends to put pressure on them, it is plain that we should aim to get the operation completed in the period between visits. It seems doubtful if we could carry the whole plun through in the five days between now and 8 February; I should therefore be inclined in any case to postpone action until then.

3. It occurs to me, however, that the situation has now somewhat changed. The purpose of these moves (apart from Hong Kong's interest in getting rid of as many Communist supporters as possible) is:-

4.

(a) To test whether it would be worth attempting to pursue the proposal to exchange Grey for Hsueh. But judging from the interview reported in Peking telno 98 to Foreign Office, it seems clear the Chinese intend to extract the last ounce of value from holding Grey and that to offer the film stars may achieve nothing except to risk an unfavourable reaction and further demands;

(b) To start a train of moves which hopefully would lead to some amelioration of the Peking Mission's situation. But from Peking telno 72 to Foreign Office it now looks as if there is a chance that the Peking Mission's movements problems can be settled without bringing in Hong Kong, and it might be risky to complicate the issue by proceeding with the film star operation at this particular moment.

In raising these doubts, I do not wish to suggest that I am unwilling to proceed I am very ready to do so. Apart from our 'Good Riddance' argument, we have to face the problem here that a number of prisoners who were convicted during the early days of the disturbances here had deportation orders made against them, and that these are due to be carried out when the prisoners are released in the next month or two. (The first release is on 19 March.) So we cannot indefinitely postpone testing the deportation weapon, although we could rescind the orders on individual cases where the behaviour of the persons concerned justified it, we could not hope to do this in all cases.

15. I should

CONFIDENTIAL