“
229,
There may
Something un
مدار
Yes.
(1051/16)
of
CONFIDENTIAL
Wellin
1 20EC 1967
F23/3
The Wild Th Dear James, FE 3/31 175
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
5 December, 1967.
I called on 4 December on Donald of Asian Communist Affairs Division of the State Department and shared him Peking telegrams Nos. 296 and 298. In doing so I drew his particular attention to Donald Hopson's recommendation that no official statement should be made if it could be avoided about his interview with Kao and also how important it was that the terms in which Hopson had spoken should not be leaked. He said that he would see that the information which I had given him was treated with due security.
2.
After we had discussed this extremely disappointing Chinese reaction to the request for visas Donald suggested that it might conceivably be that Peking was under pressure to make no concession to us about staff in Peking from
The American Consulate their own militants in Hong Kong. General had reported that the treatment accorded by the Wen Wei Pao and Ta Kung Pao had been very different in commenting on the text of the Sino-British agreement about border relations. The Ta Kung Pao had stuck strictly to the Peking line whereas the Wen Wei Pao had printed prominently on its front page alongside the N.C.N.A. article, a list of the other demands which the British in Hong Kong had yet to fulfil. The impression which the Wen Wei Pao succeeded in giving was that they were much the more militant. If this was the case, was it not also possible that there was strong pressure on Peking from the militants in Hong Kong not to concede any more points to us at the moment beyond giving our diplomats in Peking the same freedom of movement within the City as others had. view of such militants to release any of the British 'hostages' from Peking would be seen as weakness and there- fore undesirable. I said to Donald that there was nothing, as he would see, in Hopson's conversation with Kao which suggested that the Chinese had reactions to the border agreement in mind. Their complaints related to incidents connected with bombs, the libel case and Communist schools. As I saw the problem we were in grave danger of the Chinese equating the meeting of all their various demands since May in relation to Hong Kong with the release of our Mission in Peking. To meet these demands would, in effect, constitute abdication of control in Hong Kong and was clearly unacceptable.
James Murray Esq., C.M.G., Far Eastern Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.
/I said
In the
CONFIDENTIA PLAST
REF
179
NEXT
REF.
200
4
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.