}
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figure of 6 visits. If at the end of the first quarter of 1969 they were running slightly ahead of schedule then they could always revert to the matter and ask for reconsideration of their programme in the light of the situation then obtain- ing in Hong Kong and in China. There was also the question that the situation in Vietnam might have changed which would in turn affect the question of visits to Hong Kong. I realised that the U.S. Navy planners would of course like a tidy programme drawn up now for the whole of 1969, but it was no use their thinking that such a programme was really practical politics. Anything could heppen in the course of the year in Vietnam, in Hong Kong or in China which might cause dislocation of their programme since we must of course retain the absolute right to ask for changes in the light of the actual situation.
40 I hope that you and Hong Kong will agree with the advice which I have given.
Yours ever,
Michael hilfor
(K.M. Wilford)
A.F. Maddocks, Esq., Hong Kong
Rear Admiral L.E.S.H. Le Bailly, 0.B.E., BNS, Washington
C.C.
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