Cypher/Cat A
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
PEKING
ΤΟ
Telno 564
SECRET
FOREIGN OFFICE
14 June 1968
HWAŹLI
201
206.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 564 of 14 June, Repeated for information to Hong Kong, POLAD Singapore and Washington. (209
Hong Kong telegram to Commonwealth Office No. 739: United States Naval Visits.
2.
11
I should like to offer the following comments.
Paragraph 4 of telegram under reference suggests that only 'genuine" Chinese susceptibility could be a fear of possible attack on China by United States. This overlooks a great range of real Chinese sensitivity over Hong Kong. In their present state of acute xenophobia and with their own internal dissensions they are extremely touchy about use of what they regard as their territory by warships of a "hostile" Great Power, particularly when latter are engaged in Viet Nam war. They have said as much to us and we must pay some regard to what they say. Lo Kuei Po at our last meeting asked how we should react in similar circumstances e.g. if another Government allowed warships of a Power hostile to us to visit our doorstep in large numbers, when they were engage in a war of aggression against a State friendly to us. The Chinese have a big stake in continuation of the Viet Nam war and are anxious to show military backing for North Vietnamese, particularly now when Chinese policy is threatened by Paris talks, Sino-Vietnamese relations seem particularly cool, and the Soviet Press continues to twist their tails about Hong Kong. They are concerned at absence of any face- saving settlement after failure of 1967 campaign of violence in Hong Kong and may well have difficulty controlling their Hong Kong followers, All these are real problems. United States Naval visits are therefore not (repeat not) a mere propaganda exercise for them but a real political difficulty which they cannot in the present circumstances overlook. The fact that they lived with them in the past does not signify. A great deal has changed in China and Hong Kong since then.
3.
Chinese reactions so far have confirmed this. As a result of visit of Enterprise we have had a high-level protest, anti American agitation in Hong Kong, a further setback to Sino-British relations and a stoppage of exit visas, which stoppage the Chinese themselves have directly attributed to visit. We must also assume that chances of better treatment for other British subjects in China have suffered a corresponding setback. This is the present measure of damage caused by disregarding Chinese susceptibilities. We must expect further harm if we continue as before. Nor can we rule out possibility of disturbances in Hong Kong.
40
Paragraph 5 of telegram under reference. I suggested that question is secondary, since present level of Naval visits is not basic either to security or economy of Colony. I agree that thoughts of a possible American response may be some deterrent to Chinese over Hong Kong, although I feel sure that their principal grounds for restraint are economic. But the possibility of United States response will remain even if heavy United States warships do not visit Hong Kong for some time. Warships do not need to anchor in Hong Kong to exercise a deterrent effect (as paragraph 7, second
SECRET
/sentence
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.