TNAG-0021-FCO40-57-Facilities-for-US-Forces-1968 — Page 6

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

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ISD

IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

NEXT

RIF.

197

Telno. 511

31 May 1968*

193

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 511 of 31 May, Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Washington, POLAD Singapore.

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Hong Kong telegram No. 703.

In light of visit of "Enterprise" to Hong Kong and proposed visit of Boston, I should like to offer following general comments.

2.

The visit of "Enterprise" has not provoked demonstrations here or major reactions in Hong Kong. It has however been claimed by the Chinese Government as provocative and a proof of our insincerity in claiming to seek better relations and it has produced a strong protest at high level. Therefore other effects on our relations cannot be precisely assessed but we can be sure it has done us no good. Moreover by claiming that the visits by United States Naval vessels, particularly following Chinese protests, to Hong Kong constitutes a political and military threat, the Chinese have served notice that the visits are likely to be the cause of further troubles.

3. At present time we are being asked for clearance for several large United States ships following closely on one another. The whole level of the visits also seems higher than in the past. I should be glad to know how it compares with the same period in for example 1966.

4. In estimating the likely effect of future visits comparisons with Chinese reactions in past years are misleading. The Chinese level of tolerance is now much lower than it was. Sino-British relations are very bad, with Hong Kong as the most sensitive point. The Chinese smart under defeat to their campaign of violence last year and failure to obtain any face-saving settlement over confron- tation issues, in particular prisoners. They may well be content to find another stick to beat us and to rally their followers in Hong Kong.

5. A further factor is the present Chinese frustration and hyper- sensitivity over Viet Nam. This will make a campaign against military use of Hong Kong particularly attractive to them. It is an issue sure of engaging North Vietnamese support.

6. But present policy as I understand it, is that since we fear the effect on confidence and order in Hong Kong we are unwilling to make the concessions for example over the prisoners which might help to end confrontation and restore Sino-British relations to something like their former state. We hope however that our removal of restriction on the Chinese officials in London and the passage of time will help to bring a return to more normal conditions, which would mean inter alia better treatment for this mission and British subjects in China.

CONFIDENTIAL

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