TNAG-0020-FCO40-56-Facilities-for-US-Forces-1967 — Page 9

Cypher

FLASH SECRET No.691

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 24 May 1967 R. 24

19

loy

11

1 31 OZ

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a HW11/17

Original a

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D. Repeated PRIORITY to: Peking No.263

POLAD Singapore No.128 Washington No.1 391 LAST

(S. of S. please pass to all

AFF

My telegram No.680 (not repeated).

Following from Galsworthy.

NEXT

100

REF.

action.

I

Following is summary of our views on possible future

International Aspects

1. Any deterioration in our relations with Peking runs the risk of adversely affecting the situation over Hong Kong. We therefore again strongly advise no action be taken against N.C.N.A. in London (Hong Kong telegram No.682).

2. Providing we hold on successfully in Hong Kong and the Communist campaign slackens, it may well eventually become necessary to offer Peking some way out which they at least can claim saves their face as a means of terminating the whole

This, however, we should only do from a position of strength. The enormous difficulty is to find anything suitable to offer as a face-saving gesture and then to find a means of "offering" it, without giving Peking the idea that we are weakening. This would lead to further demands, which we would find it increasingly difficult to resist as did the Portuguese in Macao.

3. The Governor is considering whether ther is anything local which could be used in this way. Another possible course is as follows. It would in any case be helpful if we could work out with the Americans a reduction of their use of Hong Kong for the rest and recreation of their armed forces. As regards naval visits, could these for example be restricted as a general rule to small units, with only occasional and well-spaced visits by major units? If we could establish such a position, while there could clearly be no question whatsoever of our "negotiating" over this with Peking, it might nonetheless be possible for them to claim it as a success. We would not of course admit this. We reise the difficulties, but feel it is worth considering.

II.

Internal Aspects

4. The maintenance of law and order here, which is obviously the first essential, seems to us to require that the Governor should be authorised to deport (and failing that detain) selected Communist leaders, if the situation deteriorates to the point of demanding it (see his telegram No.677).

SECRET

/5.