TNAG-0020-FCO40-56-Facilities-for-US-Forces-1967 — Page 181

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

SECRET

6

Req.

Nr. Barley Joe

$71

Cypher/Cat A

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

IMMEDIATE

Telno. 9

4 January, 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.9 of 4 January. Repeated for information to: Hong Kong, POLAD Singapore,Washington

(2) Foreign Office telegram No. 18 to Washington: United States

Naval Visits.

The

Chinese must be expected to make some protest if a number of United States capital ships arrive so soon after their recent Press comment particularly if ships come direct to Hong Kong after operations in Viet Nam and particularly if the presence of United States naval commanders is given any publicity. Macao incidents add a warning that at the present time Chinese may welcome opportunity for anti-imperialist rumpus, Protests about ships could easily be inflated into large-scale propaganda campaign. It is not for me to assess risk of disorder being promoted in Hong Kong, but it is not impossible that Chinese would thereby try to force us to modify our present policy on naval visits. It would therefore seem wise to err on the side of caution.

2. I do not find argument in paragraph 1 of telegram under reference that postponements would encourage further Chinese demands, entirely convincing. It assumes full Chinese prior knowledge of the projected programme of visits. It also assumes a more aggressive Chinese basic policy towards Hong Kong than seems to be the case. Though ideally they would no doubt wish to discourage United States naval visits altogether,

they do not strive hard for this objective and seem to prefer co- existence with a protest when the number or publicity of visite forces it on them. In any event I would see the risk of an intense propaganda campaign as much greater if we stick to the programme than if we now modify it. Concessions once such a campaign is under way might indeed be seen as signs of weakness.

2. [sic] From the point of view of this Post therefore some - reduction in scale of proposed visits would seem desirable. In any event I hope that it can be ensured that visits should not come directly after operations in Viet Nam and that careful restrictions on publicity (particularly the Admiral himself) can be imposed,

Foreign Office please pasa Immediate Washington 2.

Mr. Hopson

Sent 0538 4 January Recd. 07392 4 January

[Repeated as requested]

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