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༢༧༨ སམ༥ ཡསམ ན
7
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control and enable China to continue to reap the present substantial
economie bonefits. After the campaign or violence had been called
*.
off the Chinese must have encountered considerable difficultice in
explaining to their supporters why they had switched to a policy of
long-term "atruggle". In order to pursue the policy of eroding the
Hong Kong Government's authority the Chinese lase no opportunity to
try to establish a special status for Chinese organisations such as
the New Chine News Agency and Communist supporters in general. This
has been demonstrated in the line they took in negotiating for visit:
by N.C.N.A. to their representatives and other Communist journalisto
in prison which took place on 9 April.
11. The Chinese Government in a formal statement to the Pritioh Chargé d'Affaires on 8 May insisted that Hong Kong was the crux of Sino-British relations, and that we must "reply to" their deaurās,
Though continuing to avoid a reply to the demondo, the essential
pointa were taken up in a statement to the Chinese by the Charge d'Affaires on 13 April (the text is in F.0. tel. No. 356 attached to the end of this note).
12. In March, the Governor of Hong Kong had an informal approach, through delicate but normally reliable interaedisrios, purporting to have originatedwith Chou En-lai. According to this approach, the Chinese authorities would like to discuss ways and means of bringing the troubles in Hong Kong to an onl; they were, however, having difficulties with their own activists,
the basis for the discussion3
would be the previous "demands" of the Chinose Government but the
majority of these would be insisted on in token fashion only; the nost difficult problem was likely to be the release of the political prisoners in Mong Hong, but there was nothing that could not bo
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