TNAG-0019-FCO40-55-Brief-for-Secretary-of-State-s-discussions-with-Hong-Kong-s--1968 — Page 15

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

SECRET

2

Kong Government was prosecuted at first by means of demon-

etrations and inflammatory posters which gave rise to incidenta and some work stoppeg09. A general strike was called and had

some success in the transport field, but in general did not

cause serious disruption. It was followed by a four-day stoppage

of food supplies from China and an attempt to cause the port of

Hong Kong to cease functioning by means of a boycott. Neither

of these manoeuvres made any serious impact in Hong Kong.

3.

The more violent phase of the campaign was touched off

by an attack on a bordor police station on 8 July by a not

which crossed from Chine and included some militiumon. The

post was relieved by British Army unita. Encouraged by this

incident which was interpreted incorrectly as nilitary support

for "confrontation" by the Chinese Government, the local

communists staged widespread demonstrations and perpetrated

note of violence in the streets. The police retaliated by

mounting raids on communist contres, seizing stocks of weapons

and subversive literature and disorganising the communist

leadership. As a result, communist action noticeable decreased

and wap virtually confined to the planting of bombs. The last

bomb attack occurred on 25 December last. The reasons why the

campaign of violence was called off were apparently, first,

that it had attracted little popular support in Hong Kong in

the face of the firm but patient policies of the Government;

Becond, the waning of the Cultural Revolution in China had

onabled more moderate elements in the leadership to reassert

/themselves

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