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Part 1 to COS 53rd Meeting/67 27th June 1967
The initiative, both political and military, remained entirely with the Chinese Communists. They could afford to escalate events while, for foar of counter-action, we were unable to do so. For this reason no action had been taken against the left wing Press and CPG-owned organisations who openly published seditious and inflammatory material at will.
The Hong Kong Government now had limited freedom of action and could not withstand Communist pressures indefinitely without help from the United Kingdom or unless, by some chance, the remote possibility of China changing her attitude and withdrawing her demands occurred. Our main obligation was the protection of those people in Hong Kong who supported us. estimated that there are only some 10,000 hard core Communists in the Colony and that some 98 per cent of the population did not wish for a change in administration. The present confidence
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of the people in the Hong Kong Government was for many a confidence of desporation and it was important that the United Kingdom should be seen to support Hong Kong and the British position there.
In discussion, the following points were made:
The Frontier demonstrations which had taken place recently were a dangerous escalation of the situation and it would be extremely difficult to deal with these Red Guard demonstrators should they cross the border into Hong Kong. After discussing two signals (1) (2) from the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on the problem of reinforcing Hong Kong, and after the Governor of Hong Kong had supported the request of the Commander, British Forces, Hong Kong for an additional battalion, it was agreed that the proposal to redeploy one battalion to Hong Kong as a temporary measure had the support of the Committee.
10.
Although by forcing a Macao-type situation on Hong Kong the Communist Chinese would lose certain economic benefits they now enjoyed, it was apparent that economic considerations would, if necessary, take second place to political aims.
C. The crux of the matter was the maintenance of the confidence of the people in the Government and any mention of removing military forces would have an extremely adverse effect on morale. The present situation was very different to any previous trouble in Hong Kong and could go on for much longer than any of the previous troubles in the Colony's history. It was important to show that we were dealing with these difficulties reasonably easily and retained further reserves upon which to call. For this reason military assistance had not yet been called for, but the morale of the police, who had done very well, depended entirely on knowing that behind them were the military reserves.
Notes:
1.
2.
SEACOS 90.
Commander-in-Chief. Far East, signal to the Ministry of Defence dated 270907Z June 1967.
2
(Amended page issued
11.7.67)
SEE (357B)
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