TNAG-0018-FCO40-54-Kowloon-disturbances-1967 — Page 49

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

THIS DOCUMENT IS ACCOUNTABLE AND SHOULD BE RETURNED TO ROOM H. 436 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (NOT APPLICABLE TO H. 504)

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INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (0.A.G.)

297

06134

Cypher

D. 12 July 1967 R. 12

tt

#

08402

IMMEDIATE

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No.1012

Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated

T?

POLAD Singapore No. 232 (C.O. please pass IMMEDIATE)

(294

My telegrams Nos.999 and 1006.

Hong Kong Confrontation.

696

main file

There is evidence that some members of the Communist leadership in Hong Kong are dropping their former reservations against the use of violence. From what information is available it seems that "fighting groups" have been authorised to cause as much trouble as possible operating from Communist-owned properties. There appear to be several reasons for this increased militancy:-

:

(a)

(b)

(0)

(a)

(e)

frustration at the failure of industrial action;

awareness of lack of mass support and hence no expectation of early successes if the masses are relied upon;

awareness that local inferiority makes success against the police uncertain unless their morale can be sapped by casualties or overwork;

encouragement by the recent action at Sha Tau Kok (though this seems illogical since the action of the masses was effectively contained by resolute police and military);

a belief (misplaced) that the Hong Kong Government was weakening.

There has accordingly been a steadily increasing pattern of incidents, which have achieved some success, aimed at disrupting public transport by violence and contrived clashes with the police. These if allowed to continue could seriously and quickly sap police and public confidence. Indeed, there has already been some loss of confidence over the last three days as a result of a feeling generally gaining ground that the Government and the police are not taking stern enough measures to stop this violence.

2. I am satisfied that in present circumstances it is necessary to take firm measures against law breakers, the overt Communist leadership and the bases of operations from which present violent activities stem. If it can be clearly

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/demonstrated

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