TNAG-0011-FCO40-47-Kowloon-disturbances-1967 — Page 162

Cypher/Cat A

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IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 626 2 June, 1967

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205 A

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVESINo. 63

- SJUNDE

HWAY|17

リロ

Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No.419 of 2 June, Repeated for information to Foreign Office and Washington.

200

Your telegram No.762 to Commonwealth Office.

There is very little to go on from Chinese side but following is my best guess at their intentions towards Hong Kong,

2.

FEX

From what has happened so far it seems probable that the C.P.G. did not deliberately start the trouble: that the Left- wing in Hong Kong may have gone further than the C. P.G. wanted in blowing up the situation: That the C.P.G. was thereby forced (perhaps with some reluctance) to intervene politically in support of the Left-wing: that their prestige has in the process become to some extent engaged in obtaining a "success" in Hong Kong.

3 From this I think we may tentatively conclude the C.P.G.'s basic policy towards Hong Kong has not (repeat not) formally changed. But the conditions in which this policy can operate have changed in the following ways:

(a) Owing to cultural revolution Left-wing leaders in Hong Kong may be less amenable to control from Peking;

(b) In the same way owing to present turmoil in Peking level-

headed professionals such as Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi are more vulnerable to revolutionary pressures to "do something";

(c) Chinese prestige has been to some extent engaged by their

five point demands.

40

IRD

From this it would follow that it is not (repeat not) C. P.G.'s present intention to take over Hong Kong by force. Ideally they would like to gain a cheap diplomatic victory as at Macao at minimum economic cost, but they have probably realised by now that this is going to be very difficult if not impossible. It is by no means certain that they themselves have been able to decide on an alternative policy. They may try to keep the pressure up by fomenting strikes and thus play for time. It is not (repeat not) impossible that they will just have to forget their five point demands. They have been making extraordinary demands on the Indonesians over the last months

which they know will not be fulfilled. But they can, bring pressures to bear on Hong Kong which are not available in the case of Indonesia, On the other hand demonstrations against this office, closure of Shanghai etc act to a certain extent as a safety valve if the Chinese demands have eventually to be forgotten.

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